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SOCIAL SCIENCE
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IDEOLOGICAL BAGGAGE AND ORIENTATIONS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN INDONESIA

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No production of knowledge develops independently or at random. It occurs in a social context, and it helps to create the social dynamics of that context, where various ideologies are pitted against one another. Social sciences have not only studied this, but they are also a part of the phenomena under study. Couched in these general and abstract terms, the observation is too banal to be disputed by social scientists. But, beyond the general statement, there is plenty of room for discussion. For example, how exactly does ideology take an active role in the development of social sciences in a given setting, and how do these processes relate to social relations in the broader sense?

It is rather difficult to determine the beginning of the growth of Indonesian social sciences, because this depends on how we set the boundaries. It is easier to say that Indonesian social sciences, as an academic activity in the field of social studies carried out by Indonesians in a systematic and formal manner within Indonesian society, experienced a sustained and very visible growth that began in the 1960s. Determining such a starting point is not to deny the role, contribution and achievements of those people active in this field in the years before this.

For several decades, there were studies about Indonesia by foreigners and written in foreign languages, circulated mainly outside the territory of the colony of the Dutch Indies or the Republic of Indonesia. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, some residents of the colony of the Dutch Indies, pre-independent Indonesia, and then Indonesia itself received a formal education in the social sciences,

usually outside Indonesia, and used a non-Indonesian language for their work. Presented below is a study that concentrates on the social sciences as a part of social change in Indonesia, set in a global context. It is to be expected, therefore, that such a study would have to focus its attention on the rule of the New Order, with references to relevant earlier developments.

Viewed from an extreme vantage point, the social sciences in Indonesia have always openly and almost totally been in the service of whatever government was in power. The change in rulers over the same state, from the formation of the colonial Dutch Indies state to that of the Republic of Indonesia post-1998, has not brought with it any radical change in the character or orientation of the interests of the government, nor in the policies used to promote the development of the social sciences. These interests comprise a rather short list: some projects aimed at creating a stable government administration, the collection of data on "traditional" communities, the modernization of these traditional communities, industrialization and, since 1945, nation building.

There is, therefore, no need for a complex analysis to explain the ideology and partisanship of social sciences and social scientists during this time: they openly served the official interests of the government of the day, and there was no open discussion of the political implications of such a practice.[1] If there is anything to be examined, it is not whether or not there was any ideological interest or baggage in the social sciences in Indonesia or even what the character of the dominant ideology was. Attention needs rather to be focused on the issues of why, how and to what extent these things happened or experienced change. A study of ideology in social sciences would be more challenging in an environment where ideas about neutrality in method, objectivity of data, scientific deduction, the universality of values and meaning, or the autonomy of scientific institutions are respected, either as myth or in practices protected by law and morality. It is only in this environment that we can seek to demolish these myths and expose the ideological interests of different institutions and social science practices.

Examined more closely, and viewed from another extreme vantage point, a range of ideological variations and nuances in the various social science activities in this country can be identified. Although the social sciences may have been in the service of one or two dominant ideologies, the different activities did and do possess

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[1] Of course, there were exceptions. The prevalence of a formal social science environment so marked by subservience to pragmatic research and in the service of the primary client ordering such research, namely the government, did provoke some independent-minded and critical intellectuals to revolt against this situation. They channeled their energies into activities as intellectual-cum-activists. But they too behaved in the same manner as their opponents: very open in their ideological partisanship.

heterogeneous features. Studies of the differences within a social sciences research institution, among a group of different schools of thought, within a specific period of time, and comparative studies of the works of specific individuals, can be very informative. However, such narrowly based studies need a lot of page space and are outside the scope of this chapter. There are too many variations and the differences between them perhaps do not carry sufficient weight in the main current of the "ecosystem" of the dominant ideology and power in society.

This chapter will try, in more general terms, to study ideological differences in the social sciences in Indonesia through the study of various phenomena: not too narrow or focused on any particular individual, or representing a micro study; nor too broad as to constitute a macro or comprehensive study. Specifically, the chapter will examine the strong bias of New Order "Developmentalism", and also look at some of its critics among social scientists. However, before proceeding, it may be worthwhile to note the approach and biases in this chapter, as well as some of the features of New Order society that have set the context for Indonesian social science.

ON IDEOLOGY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

"Ideology" is used here to refer to a system of knowledge, outlooks, awareness, tastes and values, and general attitude, which coincides with the specific interests of a social group, whether or not those articulating this system are conscious of its partisanship. In the stricter classical Marxist understanding of the term, ideology is restricted to that which reflects the interests of one of two prominent social classes, often in fundamental contradiction to each other. In this chapter, the term is given the broader meaning since such an understanding is more appropriate to the material being analysis, as will be explained below.

Since the 1970s, and perhaps even earlier, it has been difficult to defend the commonly held idea that a specific ideology can monopolize or completely dominate a system of knowledge, which is a scientific discipline, reflecting a total subordination to the general interests of those wielding power, be they the capitalist class, a political party monopolizing state power, or even a dictator and his family and cronies. This outdated notion is not unrelated to the crisis of classical Marxism and some of the social movements inspired by Marxism. This chapter will not, therefore, reproduce the naïve and simplistic perspective that "discipline X" is dominated by "ideology Y", where X and Y are very well defined phenomena.

Another practice of scholars which will not be reproduced here is that of "creating" a "history" of social sciences in Indonesia that develops or proceeds in tandem with political changes at the state level, whether during the Dutch period,

the Japanese period, the early independence period, Guided Democracy, the New Order, or *reformasi*. To my understanding, no such history exists, except in the imagination of some writers. Much of the activity in humanities and the social sciences of this society has been dispersed and fragmented.

The following study is based on a number of assumptions that should be presented from the beginning. The first assumption is that every scientific or scholarly activity can adopt or express more than one ideological value, and they are not necessarily mutually supportive. The scholar may or may not be aware of this. Each scholarly discipline is susceptible to the influence of many kinds of mutually incompatible ideologies. This means that within the infrastructures of scholarship in any society, we will find a conglomeration of different ideologies.

The second assumption is that during specific periods in the life of a society, one or two ideological streams might become more dominant. When a social order becomes more stable over an extended period of time, as can be seen in both industrial societies, and pre-industrial and pre-colonial communities in many regions of Asia, there exists one strong and resilient ideology, which is no longer considered to be "ideology" to the members of that social order. At present, many societies are experiencing great changes in many spheres, including ideology. In such a situation, several ideologies compete for dominance. This struggle for dominance may succeed if or when a number of changes or major conflicts are resolved either peacefully or through violence.

Since its formation as a nation at the beginning of the twentieth century, Indonesia has experienced a long history of upheavals and crises in many spheres, including economics, politics, morality, military affairs, and technology. This means that no one ideological form has had the opportunity to assume dominance at any point in time. If there was an extended period of time that was relatively stable, it was the period of the New Order government (1966-1998), although this stability was maintained, initiated and terminated through a series of violent actions and crises. It is therefore possible to identify one ideology that was relatively strong in social life during the New Order. It is also not surprising that we find a development of the scholarly world, including the social sciences, during this New Order period that was marked by stability and by specific ideological features. This ideology can be defined in a number of ways, the most popular being Developmentalism.[2]

There is another point to be noted before we consider the identity or features of an ideology embodied in the social sciences. In relative comparison to Western intellectual

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[2]   As the name of a dominant school of thought or group, the term Developmentalist is spelt with a capital "D", as is also the case with "Development". For a detailed study of the concept of Developmentalism in Indonesia, and its semantic history, see Heryanto (1995).

traditions, the social sciences in this country can not be said to have developed as a well-established institution of influence. The social sciences have developed more slowly and are weaker than in neighboring countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand or the Philippines (Booth 1999; Nordholt and Visser 1995).

One tell-tale sign of the slow and weak growth of the social sciences in Indonesia is the dearth of comprehensive and serious research into itself. There is still no journal equivalent to the now defunct *Prisma*. Between 1976 and 1990, *Prisma* published six special editions about universities and education. But, there was never an issue devoted to examining the history or growth of the social sciences.[3] The one edition that did examine some such aspects of the social sciences was Volume 12, No. 6, 1983 discussed below. We will also consider one of the few freelance articles discussing this subject, namely that by Benny Subianto (1989). The closure of *Prisma* and the fall of the New Order are perhaps not directly connected. But, the proximity of these two events, particularly at a time that saw a liberalization of the mass media, is evidence that repression by the authoritarian regime was not the sole reason for the weakness of the social sciences in Indonesia.[4]

The book *The Social Sciences in Indonesia*, edited by Koentjaraningrat (1975), is, to my knowledge, the only book published on this topic. It was a collection of articles by many different people, written in English, and was not widely available in Indonesian bookshops or libraries. By comparison, in the neighboring Philippines where English is more widely spoken, a three-volume work entitled *The Philippines Social Sciences in the Life of the Nation* was recently published. This was the product of a 1998 national congress of social scientists.[5] *The Southeast Asian Journal of Social Science* published a special edition (Alatas 2000) on alternative approaches in the social sciences in Southeast Asia. However, not a single article made reference to Indonesia.

This is the reason why the significance and impact of the social sciences in Indonesia on social life, whatever its ideological character, has not been particularly great. This is not to deny that there are other systems of knowledge and sciences. These other systems are usually not recognized as part of the secular, modern system of knowledge and science, a system greatly influenced by formal Western intellectual

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[3]   Perhaps this is not an accident but reflects the dominance of positivism in social science in Indonesia to date. This has wrought criticism from the proponents of post-modernism and cultural studies both of which schools of thought stress self-reflexivity.

[4]   See Human Rights Watch (1998) for more information regarding the suppression of academic freedom. For the history of *Prisma*, see Sudibyo (2001).

[5]   The writer is grateful to Mara Cynthia Rose Bautista for providing him with the first volume of this work entitled, *The History and Development of Social Science Disciplines in the Philippines* (Miralao 1999).

traditions. The various "indigenous" sciences are referred to as tradition, belief systems, myths or custom. But the truth of the matter is, the development of ideology in a society such as Indonesia does not and has not developed only, or even mainly, through the modern and formal social sciences.

Louis Althusser reminds us that any study of ideology in contemporary society must take educational institutions seriously (1971: 29-31).[6] This has a general validity, but especially in certain societies in Asia, Europe and North America where formal education is well established, where compulsory schooling for 12 years has proven to be fairly effective, and where access to higher education is not a luxury. In such societies, citizens spend a greater part of their time, at least five hours a day over a period of ten years, in school and dealing with the world of ideas, a world filled with ideology. In late twentieth century society, it would be correct to add the mass media, especially television and the internet, to the list of key instruments for the growth and spread of ideologies.

If this chapter were primarily concerned with the question of ideology in Indonesian society, the thing to study would not be the social sciences. Rather, this chapter is about the social sciences and ideology's place within the social sciences. It is not about ideology *per se* or its place in the wider environment. Given that the social sciences in Indonesia are still young and continue to develop slowly, the present chapter does not confine its scope to purely academic works published in peer review journals or ideas embodied in theses. Even *Prisma*, considered the most prestigious journal and the "pioneer of scholarly media" was not a peer reviewed journal. I shall, therefore, also consider articles and opinion columns written by social scientists for the rest of this chapter's discussion. As we know, many social scientists have gained their popularity and authority, not as a result of published academic research, but through appearances at seminars, often without research papers, published opinion pieces or media interviews.

THE NEW ORDER AND THE RISE OF THE INDONESIAN SOCIAL SCIENCES

In a number of liberal countries, the social sciences play a role of social criticism of the status quo. Perhaps more correctly, they are *thought* to have played or should play that role. In many colonial and post-colonial countries, such as Indonesia, the social sciences have been an instrument to assist state-sponsored projects and to provide the political justification for the rationale or the actual implementation of such projects. Although there are some significant similarities in conditions, spirit, and ideals among the various newly independent nations, their national projects are not uniform, since the conditions and colonial experiences have been sufficiently different (Crouch 1985). The same is true for the development of the social sciences in these countries. The following is an attempt to study, based on the research of many other scholars, the various ideologies that have been strong in the formation of the Indonesian nation-state and which have had an impact on the growth of the social sciences.

From the start, the formation of the Indonesian nation-state constituted a compromise that was necessary but never fully agreed upon by three different social groups or streams of thought. There are different terms used for these groups. In this study we will use the generally used terms of Marxist, Islamist and Developmentalist.[7] These three groups accepted the necessity for compromise because they faced a common enemy, first Dutch colonialists and later Japanese occupation. In addition they shared the common ideal of establishing an independent nation-state and developing an Indonesian identity.

But, there were also major differences between the three groups. The Marxists envisaged a modern, prosperous and independant Indonesian future through the implementation of a fundamental restructuring of the state's economic foundation as part of an international revolution. The Islamists wanted the least possible separation between the teachings of Islam and the task of developing a modern and civilized life, thereby distinguishing itself from the societies of former colonizers or their colonies. The Developmentalists, as described by Cribb (1999: 20), were the supporters of universal, liberal and secular modernity as originally espoused by the modern colonial intellectuals of the Ethical Policy period. During the New Order period, these three elements did not develop into pure or separate forms. Rather, what emerged were combinations of the three, each one exercising some influence over the others.

In reality, there exist in Indonesia many groups, aspirations and ideologies outside of these three. Each of these three groups also has their variant sub-groups. However, it is reasonable to assert that these three groups are the strongest in terms of identity

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[6] Althusser wrote: "one ideological State apparatus certainly has the dominant role, although hardly anyone lends an ear to its music; it is so silent! This is the School. It takes children from every class at infant-school age, and then for years, the years in which the child is the most 'vulnerable', ...it drums into them...a certain amount of 'know how' wrapped in the ruling ideology...or simply the ruling ideology in its pure state" (1971: 29).

[7] One recent study of the tensions between these groups is that presented by the Australian historian, Robert Cribb (1999: 20). Cribb uses the term "Muslim" to refer to the second group. In my view, this term is not appropriate for describing the differences between these three groups because there are Muslims in all three groups but not all Muslims propose Islam as the prime orientation or ideal for the nation-state.

orientation and influence. During the Soekarno period, the rivalry between these three groups intensified. Soekarno's efforts in the 1960s to reconcile the three and, at the same time to manage the whole process of government, were given the slogan, Nasakom (*Nasionalis-Agama-Komunis*, or Nationalist-Religious-Communist). It is important to remember that these efforts took place during the Cold War. Developments in Indonesia were not isolated from international tensions. As we all know, the Nasakom slogan and project collapsed in 1965 with the elimination of the communist element from the body of the Indonesian nation-state in one of the biggest mass slaughters in modern history. This event paved the way for the transfer of state power from the Guided Democracy government of Soekarno, who leaned in favor of Beijing, to the New Order under the leadership of Soeharto who was more intimate with Washington.

The New Order government was able to develop cooperation with some, though not all, of the dominant elements in society. But, these alliances were neither static nor between equals. As needs emerged, elements that were promoted or repressed changed. In the early decade of the New Order, the Developmentalists received prominence. Shortly after the New Order consolidated its militaristic power, the New Order suppressed the Islamists until the late 1980s. From that time onwards, a very visible political intimacy developed between the New Order government and sections of the Islamic community.

In the 1970s, the seeds of contradiction and criticism of the dominant ideology were planted. Oriented towards Developmentalism, the project of nation building and modernity was launched in the true spirit of Dutch Indies colonialism, albeit with a strong Javanese flavor. The priorities were economic growth, political stability, increasing formal education opportunities, extending the infrastructure, and cooperation with global international capitalist forces. Because these aspirations were in conflict with Islamist aspirations, the earliest radical criticisms came from this same group. As it turned out, the Islamists became the target of major suppression and destruction by the New Order government once the communists had been destroyed.

Although some changes did occur during the last few years of the New Order[8], the Development ideology was the only ruling ideology for more than thirty years. Because of its dominant position, criticisms of the government almost always implied criticism of the Developmentalist logic. Likewise, criticisms of development projects were also often viewed as an offence against the government. Various aspects of life,

including the social sciences, were expected to bow down and serve the national ideology. Public and official activities took place within the framework of a single direction or theme: "In support of Development".

On the other hand, it must also be acknowledged that Developmentalism was the most important sponsor of the quantitative growth in education and research, including the social sciences. This is evidenced by the growth of literacy, the number of children in school, and the increase in research, publishing and library activities.[9] As one observer put it:

> One of the most significant achievements of the New Order regime has been the expansion of education to the point where universal primary education has been almost attained; this also means that illiteracy has almost disappeared among the younger population...For the first time in Indonesian history, then, the secondary educated outnumbered those with no education, Female gains were relatively even greater than male.
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> Jones 1994: 161

According to another assessment, which was an analysis of the situation in 1941:

> There were only two tertiary education institutions for the social sciences and the humanities,...there were only two Indonesians at professorial level. Now [1983] there are no less than 74 faculties of social sciences and culture...23 faculties of education and teaching under the same system. There are also 32 faculties teaching social sciences and culture.
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> Abdullah 1983: 24

DEVELOPMENTALISM IN THE NEW ORDER SOCIAL SCIENCES

The Developmentalism that grew in New Order society can be best described as technocratism with a Javanese militaristic accent. Technocratism is neither a specifically Indonesian nor New Order concept. As in many other societies,

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[8] Towards the end of his rule, in the 1990s, Soeharto suddenly changed his political strategy. Facing divisions within the political elite and among his former allies, in particular among several retired military officers, the Soeharto government rehabilitated several Islamist leaders who had been in or

were in jail, and invited them to share power with him in government (see Hefner 2000). The dominance of Developmentalism during the New Order also did not completely eradicate Marxist and Islamist elements. Islamist thinking developed throughout the 1980s, especially after the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (*Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia* – ICMI) in 1990. To a lesser degree and in secret, the same applied to Marxist thinking after 1965. Marxist books were published (or republished) after the fall of Soeharto in 1998.

[9] For a quantitative picture of developments in formal education in Indonesia during this period, see Juoro (1990), Jones (1994: esp. pp 161-6) and Prijono (1999).

Developmentalism, as a version of technocratism, states that nature is provided as a blessing for humankind; there it exists for humankind to exploit and use for its benefit. The highest form of this exploitation requires the services of experts, science and technology, all working in a secular way, based on universal laws and principles, and neutral in and of themselves. As will be explained below, technocratism in the New Order was adopted selectively and inconsistently, contradicting its other ideological orientations.

In any case, faith in such a notion drove the state to make a strong commitment to the expansion of educational and scientific infrastructure. The state could only, however, accept the legitimacy of education and science that could be considered neutral, that is, which could be and was easily managed by those in power. This is why so many Asian regimes enthusiastically imported science and technology from the liberal West while simultaneously rejecting "liberalism". They hoped that science and technology would become enduring instruments, wielding great power yet remaining subservient, very much like a soldier, machine, worker or thug.

Although technocratism is derived from Western modernity, since the 1980s, post-colonial Singapore has been one of the most fanatical and successful proponents of technocratism. Being more technocratic than the West itself, Singapore has proudly proclaimed its success as a result of a specifically Asian spirit. In Indonesia, in its Javanese militaristic style, Developmentalism was expected to adopt and respect the social and political power structure inspired by Javanese militaristic and *keraton* (royal court) outlooks, giving the New Order the feature of the President as the peak and center of power.[10] In other words, here was a serious contradiction in terms of the New Order's Developmentalism. Universality, neutrality, and objectivity are retained as abstract rhetoric in relation to various managed activities in research and scholarship, but in practice all this was limited and subjugated by the duty to serve the interests and status of the ruling power as the sponsor of scholarship and research.

One good example of how the New Order's technocratism contradicted the feudalism that accompanied it is the program for the cultivation and development of Indonesian languages. Under the New Order, Indonesia was one of just a few countries in the world that carried out large-scale engineering of the national language. This was done on a much bigger scale than anything attempted with the social sciences. On 1 April 1975, this commitment was institutionalized with the establishment of the Center for the Advancement of Development of Language with branches in many provinces. Perhaps Indonesia is the only country in the world

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[10] Although somewhat out-of-date, Benedict Anderson's (1972) analysis of Javanese power is still useful.

that celebrates a "language month". This is all done in the name of developing "good and correct" usage of the national language according to scholarly criteria and not based on the experience of social intercourse through concrete history, which invariably produces a hybrid, if not a totally mixed character.

In many ways, and perhaps this was not always realized by the experts, the Center for the Development and Advancement of Language assisted the Government's efforts in purifying society's vocabulary and memory of political elements. It was during this period, for example, that the word *buruh* (laborer) was replaced first with *pekerja* (worker) and later *karyawan* (one who strives).[11] Arrest and interrogation by the military became popularly referred to as *diamankan* (to make secure or safe). *Demonstrasi* became *unjuk rasa*, or "to show one's feelings". But, probably the most remarkable achievement was the creation of a reality that had never actually existed: the term *Orde Lama* (Old Order) was invented to enable the projection of the regime as its anti-thesis, the *Orde Baru*, the New Order.[12] A rather unexpected result of this project was that it revealed how the language of government officials themselves was not "good and correct" according to the formal criteria set out by the state! The Language Congress of October 1998 openly criticized the linguistic practices of many officials, for example, the mispronunciation of the suffix "kan" as "ken" in the style of Soeharto. The government chided their critics, arguing that such comments were inappropriate.[13]

This Javanese militaristic accented technocratism never developed into full-blooded technocratism. This is what differentiates Indonesia from Singapore and Malaysia. Technocracy was a useful and temporary instrument to kick-start a method and process that in fact was in contradiction with the basic principles of technocracy. Since 1998, this way of doing things became known as KKN (*korupsi, kolusi dan*

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[11] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: *buruh* is the oldest term for "worker" used in political discourse. Meaning "laborer" it has always emphasized the lowly or exploited position of the worker. *Pekerja* is simply the noun made from the verb, to work (bekerja) and has no political connotations one way or the other. *Karyawan* is a more recent invention coming out of the Indonesian army's political interventions in the 1960s and 1970s which created the Golongan Karya or Functional Groups organization. *Berkarya* was politically defined as carrying out one's proper function according to one's occupation (as in the Hindu caste system). A *karyawan* was therefore anybody who carried out the proper function of their occupation. It was meant to negate any sense of workers as an exploited class. Over time in day-to-day usage, *karyawan* came more to mean "white collar worker" or office employee.

[12] These terms were not invented by the Center for Language, but they escaped any criticisms from this Center which was immersed in efforts to Indonesian-ize various technological and technocratic terms. The important thing to note is that the term "Old Order" made its way into the consciousness of those who became critics of the New Order. The habit of referring to the "Old Order" has continued among social scientists, both Indonesian and foreign, even after 1998.

[13] For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Developmentalism, the language development project and nation building, see Heryanto (1989; 1995).

nepotisme – corruption, collusion, nepotism). However, whatever its limitations, the technocratic commitment of the New Order aided the expansion of the social sciences in this country. For the first time in Indonesian history, several independent bodies were formed that were important for the growth of the social sciences in this country. These included the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (*Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial* – LP3ES) in 1971, the Indonesian Association for the Development of Social Sciences (*Himpunan Indonesia untuk Pengembangan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial* – HIPIIS) in 1975, and the Social Sciences Foundation (*Yayasan Ilmu-ilmu Sosial* – YIIS) in 1976. LP3ES published the most prestigious and enduring social sciences journal in Indonesian history, *Prisma*. Up until that time, most social science research was instituted by government bodies or political parties whose objectives were not to make new discoveries or renew an interest in social knowledge, let alone to espouse any radical criticism of the existing social order.

As explained by Michael Morfit (1981: 68): "Until 1971, almost every ministry established a research and development section to carry out what was referred to as policy oriented research." The same thing was observed by Ruth McVey in the wider context of Southeast Asia: "The main task of scholarship is to fill in the blanks rather than to test the framework." (McVey 1995: 3). This was the reason why "many of the best Southeast Asian scholarly minds have found a purely academic life stultifying and/or repressive, and have turned their energies instead to politics, administration, or other non-research activities" (McVey 1995: 3). The exact nature of the growth of the social sciences in the early decades of the New Order, and the relationship with various social demands and institutions are laid out by Taufik Abdullah (1983).

Social sciences activities were sponsored by New Order government agencies in larger numbers than in any previous period. While there were, no doubt, exceptions from time to time, these activities were carried out as formalities, as part of development projects implemented with government funds or foreign aid. These were not activities aimed at finding "truth and knowledge" to the greatest depth possible. For example, an activity would take the form of a feasibility study prior to the implementation of a development project, or an evaluation after the project had been completed. Almost all were mechanical, focused on the collection of quantitative data, and involved no detailed or critical examination of the validity of the data.

Those collecting the data never received adequate training nor did they have an understanding of the framework being used by the research supervisor, who was usually too busy with other projects in different locations and therefore did not have the time to communicate with the members of his various research teams. As these were almost required purely as a formality, the results of the research would not even receive any

attention from the departments that had commissioned the research. They almost never influenced policy decisions, which were based on pragmatic, short-term political considerations.[14] Most of the results of such research were never published and so have never been subject to the critical examination of other social scientists.[15]

Morfit also notes the existence of several semi-autonomous institutions such as the National Social and Economic Institute (*Lembaga Ekonomi dan Kemasyarakatan Nasional* – LEKNAS) and the National Center for Language Development (*Pusat Pembinaan dan Pengembangan Bahasa* – PPPB), both of which come under the umbrella of the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (*Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia* – LIPI).[16] Again, according to Morfit (1981: 69), there were only a few private institutions worth noting, and only two connected to universities. Apart from LP3ES, there was the Social Science Research Institute at Satya Wacana Christian University (*Lembaga Penelitian Ilmu Sosial* – LPIS), the Research Center at Atma Jaya University, the Development Studies Institute (*Lembaga Studi Pembangunan* – LSP) and the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). Except for LPIS in Salatiga, they were all based in Jakarta. Although classified as "private", the research conditions and activities were not markedly different in character from the national scene as described by Morfit and McVey. These observations were made in papers presented by LPIS researchers for the first HIPIIS congress held in Bukit Tinggi, 1-6 September 1975 (LPIS 1975).

Of course, not all social sciences produced in Indonesia is as bad as that indicated by the last couple of paragraphs. One of the most important figures to have successfully expressed the spirit of technocracy and modernization in a popular language was the anthropologist Koentjaraningrat. His work, *Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan Pembangunan* [Culture, Mentality and Development] (1974), comprising a series of articles previously published in the mass media, was reprinted many times because of its popularity. It became an important reference resource for many people. Koentjaraningrat, inspired by the thinking of the American anthropologist, Clyde Kluckhohn, was an Indonesian social scientist who worked tirelessly and with great commitment to explain what was "wrong" with the mentality and spirit of traditional society as it transformed into a modern society. He tried to help society modernize through a change in attitudes and cultural values.

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[14] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: This is also the reason why there has been no strong "ideology" behind the practice and structure of the social sciences in Indonesia in the way that such things developed in other former colonies.

[15] This rough outline is based upon the work done by Morfit (1981) and Abdullah (1983).

[16] A more complete list of social science research institutions during this time is provided by Abdullah (1983), but for our modest needs, Morfit's list suffices.

Given, on the one hand, the dearth of other frameworks relevant to the needs of technocratic modernization under the New Order militaristic leadership, and the overflowing need for project based "research" on the other, Koentjaraningrat's model was reproduced, albeit with methodological distortions depending on the practical needs of the different groups making reference to his model. In other words, a specific ideology about the world, truth and social knowledge had gained momentum from the material and immaterial conditions of the time to develop and become dominant in the socio-political context of the New Order. As noted earlier, this had not been a process of one or two elite groups conspiring to fool the people with an instrument called "ideology" in order to extend, defend and justify the interests of the respective groups.

The primary objects of study within this dominant system of thought were non-material things such as mentality, attitudes to life, and cultural values. Yet hundreds, perhaps thousands, of officially sponsored research projects at this time obliged the use of the most "practical and easiest" methodology, namely quantitative surveys.[17] If, in an intangible area such as culture, there was no hesitation in gathering quantitative and empirical data, there was even less hesitation in other fields such as sociology, geography, political science, or history. It is not surprising if those who took the task of critically examining these studies have been disappointed with what they found. It is not just that cultural phenomenon cannot always be measured in quantitative terms, but that basic principles of quantitative research were not properly adhered to by even the most prestigious research teams (see the detailed criticisms provided by Kleden 1987).

Throughout this century, almost every analysis of the social sciences in Indonesia has comprised complaints and statements of grave concern, despite the dramatic increase in the number of graduates, institutions, and research projects. Whilst there are examples of outstanding achievements by individual scholars, there has been no or little development of a support system that facilitates the training of graduates, sustainable research and publications aimed at promoting intellectual works of scholarship. Similarly, many of the outstanding works of individual scholars have not received the public recognition or study they deserve.

These weaknesses are not all related to insufficient funds. Financial assistance from international aid agencies has been more than adequate, at least for the short and medium term needs of individual researchers and research institutions. For

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[17] This was a very different framework than that of another anthropologist, Clifford Geertz, who had become the inspiration to scholars around the world at that time. This was due the attraction of his use of interpretative anthropology which based itself on ethnography, narration, and subjective and semiotic interpretation (Geertz 1973; 1983).

example, "The YIIS often has more funds than it can use. The difficulty is finding people who can use the funds available in order to implement social sciences research in a systematic way, and be accountable for the results." This was an area of concern, so much so that the founder and leader of the YIIS acknowledged: "We are often being pressured by the international foundations to spend the money that has been allocated to Indonesia." (Soemardjan 1983: 78). Twenty years later, I have personally observed the same phenomenon: the flood of foreign funds for social science research and the difficulty in finding interested and qualified researchers. (Heryanto 1999; 2002).

CRITICISMS OF DEVELOPMENTALISM

Reconciling the stark differences between a technocratism that relentlessly sought rationality, use-value and work efficiency on the one hand, and the parochial and patrimonial New Order social order on the other, was not the only difficulty the government faced. Industrialization under the New Order, partly reflecting its own success, produced in turn other sharp criticisms from several different quarters. The following is a discussion of the three critical perspectives that developed in the social sciences, which can be loosely referred to as the perspectives of the liberals, the populists and the structuralists. As noted earlier, the Islamist, Marxist and Developmentalist elements contributed to the ideological competition, but not in a single, separate and pure form. These various "historical legacies" resulted in the differing natures of these critical groups.

Liberalism, the forerunner of neo-liberalism,[18] was one of the most severe threats to Developmentalism because it had the backing of powerful international forces during and, especially after the Cold War. But liberalism, a force felt so strongly in real life scenarios, was not reflected to its true extent in its rhetorical and public profile (see Irwan, this volume). The public had grown suspicious of liberalism. It was populism that was lauded in public perception and rhetoric. But, facing the powerful tide of global capitalism, populism was often considered a "paper tiger". In the 1980s, Developmentalism, as with liberalism, was the object of serious criticism from the structuralists. For a while, structuralism was a refreshing change for social

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[18] There are of course important differences between liberalism and neo-liberalism, but these differences are not so significant for the purposes of this chapter. In the context of a discussion of the social sciences in Indonesia, liberalism is a broad category (from the social sciences to the humanities and arts) which emphasizes universal respect for the rights and dignity of the individual – and not a group or the state – as well as a respect for the variety among them, including for minorities. Neo-liberalism is usually considered a more recent generation of liberalism with a narrower orientation to political and economic views, policies and practices.

sciences intellectuals, and it was not long before structuralism transformed into a social movement.

(Neo)Liberalism

Liberalism in colonial and Indonesian social sciences stems from the influence of European liberalism. It has a long history but its influence has always been limited. It is easier to find books and bibliographies that romanticize neo-liberalism in the education system and public discourse than it is to find major works by Indonesians who set out consciously to espouse the spirit of liberalism. If we confine ourselves to looking at the books on university course reading lists or in libraries, we could be led to believe that liberalism, along with neo-classical thought, is indeed influential in fields such as political science and economics. But, this does not reflect the true impact of these ideas on the dynamics of Indonesian social sciences. At this point, it would be appropriate to remind the reader that there was a lack of domestic financial resources available to many social sciences institutions. The large amounts of foreign aid, especially from the United States, came in the form of scholarships, teaching staff, and textbooks that were based on liberal ideas. The foreign resources were accepted and utilized, but not understood in any depth.

Both "capitalism" and "liberalism" are terms that have been generally stigmatized in Indonesian history (Heryanto 1999a). As a result, the entry and growth of liberalism in Indonesia had to put on a "disguise", using other faces and terms. The technocratic aspects of the New Order provided fertile ground, not for the development of liberal thought, but for a normative discussion that romanticized some elements of liberalism, such as the dignity of free, autonomous and rational human beings. This approach would emerge, for example, in attacks on "traditional" society and culture and in the launching of "modernization".

One group usually considered as having played a major role in fostering the growth of one version of liberalism in Indonesia during the New Order is referred to as the Berkeley Mafia. This was a group of graduates from the University of California, Berkeley, who were appointed by the New Order government as "Development Experts" in the cabinet at the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. This version of liberalism was usually very technical and instrumental without the deeper or more comprehensive liberal philosophy or ideology. In any case, their views were quite influential in many, although not all, areas of state policy. They were also influential, to a lesser degree, in the social sciences, especially in nurturing a neo-classical perspective in economics. The private research institution called the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), founded in 1971 and close, for a time, to the New Order government, also contributed greatly to the spread of the liberal

perspective in various social sciences discourses. Overall, however, liberal influences were more strongly reflected in selected government sponsored Development practices than in the formal academic institutions, even though these influences came up against other policies and practices sponsored by the same state.[19]

The chapters by Irwan, as well as Dhakidae and Hadiz in this volume, describe the limited authority and influence of the Berkeley Mafia. Militarism, protectionism, and then corruption and collusion were in partnership with greater forces in the implementation of Development in Indonesia. From time to time, whenever it was felt necessary, government spokespersons would name liberalism as one of the most dangerous threats to the Indonesian nation-state alongside "communism" and "Islamic fundamentalism". These warnings were prolific, for example, when the ideas derived from liberation theology gained currency among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia in the 1980s.

Sympathy for selected elements of liberalism among the Indonesian public grew in the first half of the 1980s encouraged by various parties, among them some government departments. This happened in the aftermath of the economic crisis and the fall in the world price of oil. The key words or "war cry" used to pump up liberalism at that time was *wiraswasta* and *kewiraswastaan*, meaning entrepreneur and entrepreneurship respectively. A major ideological change based on sympathy for liberalism occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Just as a cross-ethnic capitalist class was developing, there was a campaign backing an ideology, which not only justified but also glorified the ideology and dominance of the new capitalist class (Heryanto 1999a). An interesting phenomenon during this period was that the campaign espousing capitalism and liberalism was not just carried out by social scientists, who traditionally wielded little authority, but rather by businessmen and government officials. For the first time in Indonesian history, businessmen appeared at seminars and conferences to present academic style papers. Their companies were often asked to sponsor academic activities and programs in the universities. Some major business figures appeared as new celebrities on the front covers of prestigious magazines, on talk shows, and even appeared on stage to read poetry (ibid.).

The term "globalization" has many widely debated connotations. However, one thing cannot be denied, namely that there has been an expansion of the network of industrial capitalism. Liberalism, in economics, morality and in intellectual affairs, has seeped into Indonesia as part of this process on a scale and depth not before

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[19] See, for example, Sen and Hill's analysis of the contradictions in the New Order's policies managing the mass media industry (2000).

experienced in Indonesian history. The term "liberal" was consciously chosen by a group of progressive Muslim activists in Jakarta to describe their group, the Liberal Islamic Network, which does not at all mean that they support American style neo-liberal economics. One of the early leaders of this group published his dissertation that openly proclaimed its neo-liberal spirit (Mallarangeng 2002). Sonny Keraf's article (1995) is another example of a perspective that warmly welcomed the liberal outlook during this time.

Despite all of these advances, at the beginning of the 21st century, neither liberalism nor capitalism was considered worthy of more serious thought or deeper understanding by the Indonesian public. Liberalism, like capitalism, is still held in suspicion, even ridiculed. For example, as is described by Wibowo and Wahono (2003)[20], liberalism's influence is more widespread and greater in Indonesia's economic practices than it is a source of inspiration or analytical framework for the social sciences.[21]

Populism

The terms capitalism and liberalism have not been accepted as worthy in Indonesia because of the strength of the history of populist romanticism, as is the case in many agrarian, colonial and post-colonial societies. One of the more resilient manifestations of this populist romanticism is the official history of the struggle for Indonesian independence, and the many sub-plots of that history, which is very much alive in the public fantasy and which has been presented to the public visually through posters, monuments, paintings, banners and decorated village gateways that commemorate independence every 17 August.

Given that New Order Developmentalism defends the interests of the capitalist class, national and city state officials and international capital, it is not surprising that Developmentalism has been seriously challenged by supporters of populism. This is probably because populists gained extra credibility and appeal from the injustices of the New Order. Yet ideologically, populism has motivated them to present sincere and continuing criticisms of New Order Development, which has been based on technocracy, half-hearted liberalism and topped with a Javanese *priyayi*[22] militarism.

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[20] See reviews of this book by Pramoedya (2003) and Magnis-Suseno (2003).

[21] In an essay regretting the weakness of liberalization in Indonesia, Faisal Basri has written: "I have deliberately put the word liberalization in quotation marks because this term is not popular and by some people is considered *najis* [filthy]: a western idea, giving fanatical support to the Washington consensus, an agent of the IMF, a follower of neoliberalism, a capitalist" (Basri 2003).

[22] TRANSLATOR'S NOTE: *Priyayi* – refers to the layer of state officials and bureaucrats which today still embody the conservative and despotic social, political and cultural outlook of the minor aristocracy of Java which became subservient to the colonial state in the 19th century and which provided much of the colonial state apparatus.

New Order Developmentalism came under attack from two elements that helped the awakening of the Indonesian nation, namely the Marxists and the Islamists, whenever the possibility existed. As mentioned, Marxism, both as a school of thought and a political movement, was physically eliminated as well as formally outlawed at the beginning of 1966. The Islamist forces were subsequently subjugated in the 1970s. This meant that the populist criticisms that did arise during the New Order developed within a system of ideas and vocabulary under the domination of the New Order.

Limited space and my knowledge on the matter do not allow me to give more than one example of sustained populist criticism, namely the school of thought, which calls itself the Pancasila Economic System (*Sistem Ekonomi Pancasila* – SEP). The original source of ideas behind the SEP was the popular socialism of the colonial era, which stressed the importance of cooperatives as a basis of the state economy. This particular form of socialism was popularized by people such as Muhammad Hatta, an intellectual during the colonial period who later became a statesman.

Economist Mubyarto, from Gadjah Mada University, one of the proponents of SEP, defined its five key features. First, "Cooperatives are the basic pillar of the economy"; second, "The wheels of the economy are driven by economic, social and moral incentives"; third, "The strong desire for the whole of society to move in the direction of social egalitarianism"; fourth, "The main priority of economic policy is...to create a resilient national economy"; and fifth, "A clear and firm balance between national planning and decentralization" (*Kompas* 1981; Mubyarto 1987). The merits of the intellectual substance of the SEP aside, it is clear from the wide public response that these ideas developed as a populist criticism of New Order Development. It is not surprising that SEP received broad sympathy from those critical of New Order Development. But, for its own safety, SEP was carefully worded so as to make it acceptable in the political climate of the time. This included using the term "Pancasila", which was at that time also in the process of being sacralized by the New Order as part of the process of justifying the repression of threats from the Islamists.

Cooperatives, the first feature of SEP, represented a populist nostalgia before capitalistic New Order Developmentalism emerged and started to cause problems for "the little people" or common man. By using the relatively old or aged term "cooperatives", which still retained revolutionary populist connotations, these critics were implying that New Order Development had strayed from the consensus and ideals of Indonesian independence. The second feature of SEP, that incentives should be social and moral and not just economic, was a moral criticism of the phenomenon of material greed that developed during the oil boom, and which accompanied the creation and rise of the nouveau riche. Egalitarianism, the third feature of SEP, was

a criticism of the gap between rich and poor that had started to cause concern in the 1980s. The fourth, nationalism, and fifth, decentralization, were features that rejected the liberal spirit represented at the time by the technocrats.

SEP can be viewed as an important statement if taken as an expression of populist sentiment and moral criticism. SEP always had, however, serious flaws as an academic concept. From the start, it attracted sharp criticism from those who had been affected by the flourishing of neo-Marxist style structuralist political economy in the 1970s. This brings us to another group of critics of New Order Developmentalism, the structuralists. It must be noted here, however, that despite being subject to very fundamental criticisms since its beginnings, SEP continues to advance.

Structuralist Political-Economy

In the New Order structuralist political economy did not emerge simply as a critical reaction to SEP. Structuralism also launched a general critique of New Order Developmentalism, including a critique of the dominant paradigm within the social sciences. Structuralism thereby opened up a broad new perspective that was very important for the dynamics of the social sciences at that time. This section will not provide an overall analysis of structuralism and its variants that proliferated during the New Order. It will rather concentrate on one version, which became the most popular among the educated public, with a number of reductions and simplifications.[23]

The primary target of structuralist critiques was the so-called, not by its own proponents, "culturalism" or the "cultural approach" to the social sciences and humanities.[24] The criticism of SEP and the social sciences system in general and Development practices in Indonesia was based on the premise that all these had been led astray by culturalism. Because of the importance of these criticisms and the debate that they provoked, this issue is the main object of study for the rest of this chapter. It is regrettable that there was a gross lack of a support system for the social sciences. Consequently, further debate on the impact of culturalism did not take place. Discussed below are (a) a brief sketch of this debate; (b) its contribution to Indonesian social sciences; and (c) its core weaknesses.

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[23] Several stricter and more thorough uses – to the extent that these characteristics made them less popular in public debate – of the structuralist framework can be studied in a number of seminar papers, thesis and articles in journals such as *Prisma*. Besides the two editors of this book, another Indonesian scholar who was a persistent proponent of the structuralist approach for many different kinds of analysis was the late Farchan Bulkin. The writer thanks the editors, and in particular Vedi Hadiz, for reminding him of the importance of Bulkin's works (1984a; 1984b).

[24] Because these names were attached to this school of thought by critics, references to them should be in quotation marks. To simplify the writing style, the use of quotation marks will not be continued but readers need to bear this note in mind.

The primary criticisms of SEP were that it was nothing more than an idealist and moralist wish list, and therefore not rooted in reality; ahistorical – not rooted in the material reality of economic and political history of Indonesia; and theoretically flawed – not based on theoretical fundamentals from the classical social sciences. One popular proponent of post-1965 structuralism, Arief Budiman, launched a criticism of SEP as part of a larger criticism of the dominant social sciences of the time (Budiman 1981; 1982a; 1989). Although Budiman did provoke some critical responses, none of these are worth mentioning.[25] "Structuralist" criticism became the main reference for those who wished to challenge the social order and the social sciences under the Soeharto regime, which had given birth to this order.

Although he was not alone, and perhaps not the first to put forward structuralism in Indonesia,[26] it can be said that Budiman was one academic who rigorously popularized the concept of structuralism among social scientists. He did this through a series of polemic lectures and opinion columns. Some of his early Indonesian language articles include Budiman 1976; 1977; 1981; 1983; and 1987a and b. Several other writings, including Budiman 1982a and 1982b were compiled into a published book (Budiman 1989). Budiman's views that are relevant to this chapter were expressed in an interview in *Prisma* (Budiman 1983), and will be considered below in some detail.

What Budiman gave to the readers of *Prisma* – the educated Indonesian public not limited to social scientists – was a re-introduction to the basics of classical Marxist thought simple enough to be digested by many people. He had obtained the inspiration for his ideas from his experiences in the United States, where he studied, at a time when structuralism was in vogue. In addition to this, he cited the example of how structuralism was used in dependency theory from as early as the 1960s and 1970s.[27] The primary message of his contributions was historical materialism: that material conditions – the base – determined all other aspects of social life – the superstructure. Unfortunately, there was one important aspect of Marxism, dialectical historicism, which he paid insufficient attention to.

I stated earlier that Budiman's contribution was a re-introduction of Marxism. Classical Marxism and socialism had actually been part of the public discourse in Indonesia throughout the twentieth century until 1965. However, much of this has been forgotten, or its history erased. As a result, it has proven difficult, especially

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[25] LPIS (1981) published a monograph comprising 28 articles from two major daily newspapers between 1979 and 1981 that were part of a polemic about the Pancasila Economic System.

[26] Sritua Arief and Adi Sasono's (1981) work is considered a pioneering work after 1965 and was also relatively popular.

[27] The results of Arief's study were presented in a doctoral thesis published as Budiman (1987a).

for younger intellectuals who were born and bred during the times of the New Order regime, to revisit their impact on intellectual thought. The irony is that Budiman had, as a student activist, led politically charged actions against leftists before they were wiped out in the mid-1960s. Perhaps Budiman's contribution and role before 1965-6 provided him with the privilege of being able to speak about Marxism and socialism. This privilege was not available to those on the left who survived the mass culling in the mid-1960s because they were stigmatized as communists.[28]

Putting aside the past of the proponent of these ideas, the ideas presented by Budiman to the Indonesian public at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s were a breath of fresh air. He had a huge influence on those who did not have the chance to study overseas and become familiar with ideas forbidden in Indonesia. Over a period of a few short years, Budiman's radical criticisms of the social sciences cast a spell on the students and younger generation who felt dissatisfied with the dominant paradigm that was inspired by the modernization theory. Budiman's popularity as an activist in 1966, especially among students outside Jakarta, added to the credibility of his criticism of the culturalist approach. In a formulation more scholarly than Budiman's more popular presentations, Benny Subianto explained the enemy of structuralism, "the cultural approach":

> ...as an approach in the social sciences that makes culture an independent variable and non-cultural aspects as dependent variables. The cultural approach had the pretension to explain social reality based upon cultural factors through both induction as well as deduction. And in this way to present an empirico-analytical character.
>
> Subianto 1989: 59

In a broader social sciences context, this culturalism is also known by other names such as idealism, humanism, orientalism, or functionalism. The senior scholar who came under the most sustained attack from Budiman was Koentjaraningrat and his book mentioned above, *Kebudayaan, Mentalitet dan Pembangunan* [Culture, Mentality and Development], 1974.

HISTORICAL DIALECTICS, SUBJECT AND STRUCTURE

The above-mentioned article by Subianto is evidence that there was a time when structuralism was "in vogue".[29] Subianto's article is one of the few Indonesian language articles that presents a comprehensive "history" of the social sciences from colonial

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[28] As of 2003, the Indonesian parliament still rejects Marxism and communism as a legitimate part of political life and open intellectual discussion in this country.

times to the 1990s. The main aim of Subianto's article was to present a lengthy criticism of the cultural approach, which presumably dominated almost the whole history of the social sciences, along with several less fundamental variants, in particular from the colonial and New Order periods.[30] The history presented by Subianto concluded on a happy note, namely the arrival of "the structuralist approach as a criticism of the established groups in the social sciences in Indonesia" (Subianto 1989: 74). This was possible because, according to him, of the availability of study opportunities in the United States for Indonesian scholars in much the same way that "the cultural approach" gained dominance (ibid.).

But, it was not an entirely happy ending. According to Subianto: "The structuralist approach that has developed over the last five years still mainly exists at the margins of the social science community" (1989: 74). This was especially true of the works that were not presented in the same popular manner used by Budiman (see note 23). In practice, structuralism never achieved a position as the most dominant and widespread approach in social sciences research. But, as an ideology, it can be said that structuralism became one of, if not the only, 'politically correct' framework of thought of authority, particularly among independent researchers and public intellectuals, student activists, and non-government organizations, which were flourishing in many regions. Their numbers were not great compared to the number of university graduates, but their status as an "elite", some would even say their celebrity, among the intellectual-activists meant that structuralism became the main rhetoric of criticism and ultimately a new orthodoxy.

As mentioned above, there was no debate in the sense of a genuine dialogue. It appears that the older generation of social scientists, those pursuing culturalism and technocratism had neither the interest nor adequate knowledge in the literature referred to by their critics. On the other hand, the critics were far more familiar with both the material that they were attacking and the new perspective they subscribed to. That is the reason why a balanced or mutually enlightening debate did not ensue. Lacking counter-criticism, or self-criticism from within, the structuralists found it difficult to advance and make more significant contributions to scholarship in the country. In fact in some cases, the reverse happened. As is the case with so many great -*isms*, after rising to the surface as a radical challenger to the dominant wisdom of the day, becoming popular, if not dominant, Indonesia's

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[29] The strength of structuralism, at least as a term or slogan, can best be grasped by looking at a number of articles by intellectuals in the mass media at that time. Several examples are Kaiseipo (1982), Budiawan (1987), Massardi (1988), Azhar (1991), Pratikto (1993) and Sutrisno (1994).

[30] In a footnote, Subianto provides a list of examples of "the social scientists who studied in the United States at the end of the 1950s and 1960s...most of the above theses stressed cultural aspects and rarely or indeed never touched on political economy" (Subianto 1989; 69, fn. 35).

structuralism subsequently took on a dogmatic and inflexible character. It experienced the fate of the so-called "cultural approach", an ideology that it had set out to criticize.[31]

An ironic example of the degeneration of the critical and radical character of the structuralist perspective is the development among its supporters of the idea that capitalism and socialism were static, "ready to use" options of development strategy that could be adopted by free and rational human beings already enlightened by structuralism. In other words, the belief was that anyone who swung either towards capitalism or socialism was, in effect, favoring an ideology quite outside the realm of structure and history. The two reified scientific or scholarly approaches, structuralism and the cultural approach, were depicted as two autonomous tools that could be chosen by whomever, whenever. In other words, idealism and humanism, the spirit of the cultural approach that had since become anemic and mechanistic, had staged a comeback under the guise of structuralism or socialism, often involving the very same people who had been the harshest critics of the cultural approach. It was also during this time that an attempt was made to reduce the whole spectrum of social sciences to a simple dichotomy: culturalism versus structuralism.

The following is quoted from a compilation of Budiman's works written in the 1980s, a time when the pro-structuralist debate was waning and the quality of debate declining drastically:

> To simplify things, we can say that there are two approaches that dominate in the social sciences. One is the pole that emphasizes aspects of individual psychology and the system of social values that surround them. We can call this pole as the pole of the cultural/psychological approach. The second pole emphasizes the human being's material environment, that is the social organization and the system of material benefits that it provides....This pole is known as that using the structural approach.
>
> Budiman 1989: 44

This culture-versus-structure dichotomy was reproduced on a massive scale in discussion and consciousness among social scientists, especially among the younger generation. Budiman himself, acknowledged, after presenting this dichotomy: "The division of the social sciences into these two poles is an over-simplification. There are many approaches located somewhere in between these poles" (ibid.).

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[31] This is the conclusion of Vedi Hadiz (1989) about the political character of the "cultural approach" in Ben Anderson's contributions to Indonesian studies, at least among foreign scholars. However, I am talking here of a more general phenomenon.

Budiman qualifies his statement by saying that he was referring specifically to Indonesian social sciences. However, this important qualification was often passed over or ignored by the public in their excitement to embrace the new ideas being presented. Yet, even this narrowing of focus is not in accord with reality. This is because not only are there many other approaches existent in the social sciences, but these other approaches reside outside, behind, above or on the other end of the spectrum of the dichotomy; they are not located only "between these poles" as Budiman describes. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that Budiman's statement is more relevant to post-1965 social sciences, particularly in relation to the social scientists who had just returned from study in the United States. The social sciences discussions in Indonesia at this time appeared in many respects to be an extension of lecture-hall discussions in the United States. The topics, figures and schools of thought that they discussed came straight from their reading lists for the courses they were taking in the United States. This is why Indonesian scholars who studied elsewhere other than the United States, scholars such as Y.B. Mangunwijaya, Ignas Kleden and Vedi Hadiz, were not predisposed to popularizing the cultural/structural dichotomy in the 1980s.

Why did structuralism not advance further in Indonesia? To answer this, we must consider the "two-pronged approach" model put forward by the structuralists. However, we need to treat this dialectically, and not as a simple dichotomy. First, we can explain it in a materialist or structuralist manner. Second, we can add to this explanation by looking at the internal weaknesses of the theory as presented in publications in Indonesia in the 1980s.

From a materialist or structuralist point of view, the failure of post-1965 structuralism was due to the fact that this -ism, which appeared radical at first, was, in reality, merely a pretty idea in the minds of a small intellectual elite. It went from essay to essay, from seminar to seminar, and from interview to interview without becoming materially embodied, or manifested in praxis, contrary to what its proponents argued should have happened. In reality, structuralism was raised up as a new superior system of cultural values pushing aside modernity or Development, or Pancasila, but framed once again in terms of idealism, humanism and romanticism. The structuralism that was trumpeted during the New Order period never practiced what it preached.

The irony is that the Pancasila Economic System, as proposed by Mubyarto and his colleagues and which had been criticized as being rooted in the cultural approach, has since continued to develop further in terms of institutional structures. Stepping over the corpse of the structuralist controversy, having never really responded to the rather effective criticisms from the structuralists, Mubyarto founded the Centre for the Study of Pancasila Economy at Gadjah Mada University in September 2002.

At the time of writing, investigations were under way regarding the possibility of setting up five more such centers at tertiary institutions in Semarang and Yogyakarta. The key ideas of Pancasila Economy are still being introduced into high school curricula in 2004 (Wahyuni 2003). And it is ironic that all this is happening at the same time that neo-liberalism has grown stronger in Indonesia, even if it has not yet become the intellectual basis for social science.

Second, theoretically and intellectually, the failure of structuralism in Indonesia after 1965 can be traced back to its failure to explain its own emergence. Its followers did not follow through the logic, or rather the philosophy of structuralism. Therefore, they were unable to explain their own place as products of the structures they were analyzing. In other words, they lost the ability to carry out self-criticism and self-reflection, which actually prepared the ground for the emergence of post-structuralism. To give a clearer picture of what was missing from the Marxist version of structuralism presented by Budiman in the 1980s, I quote below the rather lengthy analytical explanation from Perry Anderson, a prominent figure in western European neo-Marxism:

> To define Marxism as a critical theory simply in terms of a goal of a classless society, or the procedures of a consciously materialist philosophy, is obviously insufficient. The real propriety of the term for Marxism lies elsewhere. What is distinctive about the kind of criticism that historical materialism in principle represents, is that it includes, indivisibly and unremittingly, self-criticism. That is, Marxism is a theory of history that lays claim, at the same stroke, to provide a history of the theory. A Marxism of Marxism was inscribed in its character from the outset, when Marx and Engels defined the conditions of their own intellectual discoveries....

> Anderson 1983: 11

How do we explain the rise of a proponent of a Marxist version of structuralism, such as Budiman's, at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s in Indonesia? The spontaneous and typical answer would be that he had the chance to study in the United States at a time when neo-Marxism was briefly on the rise, as explained by Ortner (1984: 138-44). If Budiman had been given a scholarship ten years earlier, it is conceivable that he may have become a proponent of one of the versions of the cultural approach; ten years later and he might have become a proponent of a perspective sympathetic to post-modernism.

Although "historical", such an explanation may not be considered sufficiently "structural" or "Marxist" in terms of the version popularized by Budiman himself,

and which was used to criticize SEP. Budiman had attacked the widely held view in Indonesia at the time that education could play an important role in changing an individual, and thus lead to social change.[32] Following classical Marxism in its basic version – neo-Marxist thinkers and cultural studies in western Europe meanwhile were taking things further and carrying out self-criticisms and reformulation – Budiman stressed that changes at the level of thinking could only happen after there was a change in structure: "If we want to change things, then we must change first the basic elements of structure in society. Only then through ideological, educational and other influences, values can change" (1983: 84). According to him: "Everybody, including the social scientist, sees issues from the point of view of their class, namely the social position of the people who received this information" (ibid.: 82). But, how can this theory relate to the experience of Arief Budiman himself? In an interview with *Prisma*, Budiman again embraced all the perspectives he had been attacking so relentlessly, namely, idealism, romanticism, humanism and even fantasized about the emergence of a "superman":

> There are people who can transcend reality, its structure. Most people cannot do this....There are people who can transcend structures of whatever kind. For example, Marx was a bourgeois, but he had a socialist consciousness...I myself do not understand what it is that allows somebody to transcend. Education is perhaps one factor. But it is not the total explanation. So I resolve this dependence between structure and values through the existence of people within the structure who are supernormal. But this is not structural at all....Class interests can be defeated by this....What is clear is that such a person is not tied to the existing social conditions.

> Budiman 1983: 84-5

It can be argued that structuralism was denied the chance to develop to a higher level of maturity due to a lack of its being challenged through intense debate. In addition, both structuralism, outside of recent Marxism, and culturalism were poorly understood. The two things had, in fact, shared a history and were profoundly related, were juxtaposed, and eventually caricatured as a dichotomy for the purposes of polemics. In one of his articles on the topic, "The Culture of Power or the Sociology

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[32] In an interview with *Prisma*, Budiman is reported as saying: "Economists state that the difficulties in Indonesia are a matter of mentality. The social sciences also emphasize mentality. Education is the therapy. The economists also say we have insufficient skills, that we do not have a mastery of technology. The therapy is again education! The conflict between them is very artificial. Their assumptions are liberal assumptions, namely that the problem of development is a problem of individuals and not a problem of improving the social system" (Budiman 1983: 78-9).

of Power?", Budiman (1987b) put forward the question, in an ahistorical manner and based on the dichotomous approach: "Which of the two approaches is the most cogent in explaining power?"

Fortunately, not all the disciples of structuralism and/or Marxism after that period became imprisoned in this caricature of a dichotomy. Several younger scholars made scholarly contributions reflecting a more mature structuralist perspective, in both the Marxist version as well as in other versions. In the culturalism camp, too, there were increasing numbers of cultural studies containing insights into structural issues. It is neither possible, nor necessary to present a long list here. But, there are several names that should be mentioned, including Ignas Kleden, Daniel Dhakidae, Vedi Hadiz, Alexander Irwan, Hilmar Farid, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, and Goenawan Mohamad. In their hands, cultural dynamics is not just a nuisance in an intellectual analysis that should be discarded, or made the object of hostility, but should be taken seriously as part of the dialectics of history, power, political-economic structure, and consciousness.

Although a faithful disciple of Marxism, Vedi Hadiz (1989) appreciates the strengths of the cultural approach as adopted by Benedict Anderson. Perhaps because of his leanings towards Marxism, his analysis, full of praise for this culturalism, concluded with a predictable message, namely, that no matter how far this approach tried to be rebellious, it would soon be tamed by the much bigger conservative current among its followers: "The cultural perspective contributed by him (Anderson), which originally had the quality of an 'intellectual rebellion' against the mainstream in the study of Indonesian politics, will be absorbed into this mainstream, so that it will lose its 'radical' meaning" (ibid.: 30).

Hadiz's assessment was not invalid. But, as has been shown above, the same can be said of many approaches or other -isms, including structuralism and Marxism. The pronouncements by Soeharto and so many New Order officials that economic development as the basis of a stable society was a precondition for Indonesia to be able to develop in other areas including law, morality, or culture, does not appear at first glance to be different from the classic propositions of Marxism as popularized by many of its dogmatic proponents.

In his history of the social sciences, Benny Subianto has also tried to be fair by acknowledging that there have been examples of innovative non-structuralist works. He cites the works of Sartono Kartodirdjo on the Banten peasant protests at the end of the 19th century (Subianto 1989: 75). Yet, according to a disciple of the cultural approach, Kartodirdjo's work contains more problems than solutions (Stange 1989: 10). In reality, what is called "culture" usually has a very different meaning for those working in cultural studies from its critics who work from outside these circles. The same applies to many other -isms.[33]

CONCLUSIONS

The above discussion shows that the use of certain formal slogans and rhetoric, for example, structuralism, liberalism, or culturalism, in a work of social science does not in itself prove that those involved have represented or have utilized their -ism to maximum effect, or even in a systematic and consistent manner. The practice in the social sciences of applying a formal theoretical approach has not in itself been sufficient to demonstrate the character of the "ideology" being proposed and implemented by its proponents. Many -isms that at first appear to be radical, break-through forces, become inflexible and frozen as they grow in popularity and dominance. There are good and bad expressions and followers of every -ism. In polemics, there is always the temptation to highlight the opposition's worst or weakest examples of theories, ideas and rationale, whilst emphasizing and using only the best among one's own armory.

The most important period of growth in the history of Indonesian social sciences occurred during the period of the New Order militaristic regime. The criticisms put forward by the structuralists and post-1965 Marxists in the late 1970s and early 1980s against the dominant social sciences, the cultural approach, re-energized the social sciences. Almost without exception, the social sciences using the "cultural approach" were subservient to political, material or ideological interests, which were openly formalized by the government.

However, many of these criticisms were delivered in an exaggerated manner, as if the rulers at that time were in great need of the social sciences, or that the social sciences played some major role in sustaining the status quo. In reality, this was not the case. Most of the work of social sciences at that time was technical and formal in character, done for a range of government, social and economic development projects. The government was not really interested in the "substance" of this work but simply whether or not there was "proof" that the research had been done as a formal requirement of the project (Morfit 1981; Abdullah 1983).

It was also unfortunate that the structuralist criticism of the cultural approach was often overdone, extending into unnecessary hostility and dichotomy. The criticisms of the "cultural approach" during the New Order in Indonesia were discussed as if they presented an adequate, if not comprehensive, picture of all academic studies centered on cultural dynamics. It is a pity that some of the outstanding cultural studies from outside Indonesia were not circulated widely in

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[33] According to Stange: "...every religion defines itself as a hermeneutic circle which has meaning only for those participating within it and never for those just peering in from outside...all systems of thought – at least in this sense – are religions" (1989: 8).

the country until the 1990s. As a result, many social scientists in Indonesia, who generally lack an interest and are not well trained in cultural issues in any case, have a poor understanding of the intellectual dynamics in cultural studies other than those painted by the political economists. Even more ironic is the fact that the structuralism that succeeded in shaming the cultural approach in the social sciences eventually emerged as a new "culture" that was held in awe and glorified with methods and a spirit that differed little from that which propelled culturalism, namely idealism, romanticism, ahistoricism and humanism. In other words, the instrumentalist and liberal ideology that stressed the "autonomy" of the modern subject and which was so compatible with the processes of modern capitalism continued to grow after culturalism had been so relentlessly challenged by structuralism.

From the beginning of the twenty-first century, what was lacking in the growth of contemporary structuralism in Indonesia was self-criticism and self-reflection. This latter feature appeared in the twilight of the last decade of the twentieth century, which was marked by the end of the New Order and of the Cold War that gave birth to the regime. Self-reflection made an appearance in the social sciences arena in Indonesia through the current of post-modernism. Yet, as with other -isms, this new force, which was also deemed radical in its early stages, is not immune from the diseases that afflicted its predecessors.

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